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 QUÉBEC/CANADA 
DIRECTEUR PARLEMENTAIRE DU 
BUDGET  
DPB, « Imposition des primes d’assu-
rance-maladie payées par l’employeur », 
24 mai 2018, 30 p. (révisé le 1er juin 2018) 
La non-imposition des primes 
d’assurance-maladie payées par 
l’employeur coûte 3,8 G$ au 
gouvernement fédéral. 
Deux députés ont demandé au directeur parle-
mentaire du budget (DPB) de mesurer l’incidence 
de l’inclusion, dans le revenu imposable des em-
ployés, de la couverture des soins de santé payée 
par l’employeur (c.-à-d. des cotisations de l’em-
ployeur à un régime privé d’assurance-maladie).  
Le DPB a déterminé que cette mesure aurait pour 
effet d’augmenter de 2,8 milliards de dollars l’im-
pôt fédéral sur le revenu des particuliers.  
Pour l’analyse, le DPB a utilisé les données tirées 
de la Base de données et du Modèle de simulation 
de politiques sociales (BD/MSPS) de Statistique 
Canada. Il s’est aussi servi des données fournies 
par l’Association canadienne des compagnies d’as-
surances de personnes (ACCAP), des seuils de ré-
férence du Conference Board du Canada et des ra-
tios de couverture présentés dans un document de 
politique du Wellesley Institute.  
INSTITUT FRASER 
S. Lafleur, B. Eisen et M. Palacios, « The 
Decline of the Other Alberta Advantage: 
Debt Service Costs in Alberta Are Ri-
sing », 24 mai 2018, 9 p. 
Si la dette de l’Alberta poursuit la 
tendance des dernières années, la 
province se joindra à Terre-Neuve-et-
Labrador et au Québec (et possiblement 
à l'Ontario) comme seules provinces à 
payer plus de 1 000 $ par année per 
capita en paiements d'intérêts sur la 
dette 
The Decline of the Other Alberta Advantage: Debt 
Service Costs in Alberta Are Risingfinds that 
every Albertan will pay, on average, $442 this 
year in interest on the province’s growing debt, 
compared to just $58 a decade ago. And if the prov-
ince’s debt trend continues, debt-servicing costs 
may exceed $1,000 per person within the next 10 
years. 
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INSTITUT FRASER 
C. Lammam et H. MacIntyre, « Increa-
sing the Minimum Wage in British Co-
lumbia: A Flawed Anti-Poverty Policy », 
29 mai 2018, 16 p. 
Augmenter le salaire minimum produit 
plusieurs conséquences économiques 
inattendues néfastes aux jeunes 
travailleurs. 
Increasing the Minimum Wage in British Colum-
bia: A Flawed Anti-Poverty Policy finds that de-
spite misperceptions, more than 80 per cent of 
B.C.’s minimum-wage earners don’t actually live 
in low-income families. In fact, last year, the ma-
jority of minimum-wage earners in the province 
(55.7 per cent) were teenagers or young adults 
aged 15 to 24, almost all of whom (77.9 per cent) 
lived with their parents or other relatives. 
THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY 
(UNIVERSITÉ DE CALGARY) 
E. Beaulieu, « North American Free 
Trade Under Attack: Newsprint is Just 
the Tip of the Iceberg », 1er mai 2018, 28 p.  
Les États-Unis s’attaquent depuis 
longtemps au rôle du gouvernement 
canadien dans l’industrie du bois-
d’œuvre, mais leurs attaques à l’égard  
de l’industrie du papier journal sont 
beaucoup plus larges et créatives.  
Canada is now getting a good look at just how ag-
gressively protectionist the Trump administration 
in the U.S. is ready to act. It has hit Canadian 
newsprint exports with punishing tariffs based on 
unjustified claims that the Canadian industry is 
both subsidized and dumping product below fair-
market value into the U.S. marketplace. This lat-
est trade skirmish, following President Donald 
Trump’s demands to renegotiate NAFTA, Ameri-
can-instigated trade challenges to Canadian ex-
ports of softwood lumber (yet again) and Bom-
bardier aircraft, and Washington’s initial threats 
to levy duty on Canadian aluminum and steel 
(now on hold), should set off alarm bells beyond 
the newsprint industry. Canada’s policy-makers 
and exporters should be on notice that the admin-
istration is clearly eager to penalize the exports of 
an ostensibly free-trade partner based on over-
wrought claims. 
   ÉTATS-UNIS 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
L.Pavetti et L.Schott, « House Bill to 
Reauthorize TANF Makes Improvements 
But Doesn't Go Far Enough », 23 mai 
2018, 8 p. 
Le Congrès devrait permettre aux États 
de se concentrer à donner de la flexibilité 
aux familles pour leur permettre de 
meilleurs résultats en emploi. 
A bill to reauthorize the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program that House 
Ways and Means Committee Chair Kevin Brady 
and Human Resources Subcommittee Chair 
Adrian Smith introduced on May 17 makes some 
improvements in TANF, but doesn’t go far 
enough.  On the positive side, it holds states ac-
countable for TANF recipients’ employment out-
comes and begins to constrain how they use fed-
eral block grant funds (and, to a lesser degree, 
state TANF funds).  On the negative side, it adds 
no new money to the TANF block grant, which has 
been funded at the same level since 1996 and has 
lost almost 40 percent of its value due to inflation, 
even as the number of poor children remains 
roughly unchanged.  The bill also fails to hold 
states accountable for assisting families in need, 
and it maintains important elements of TANF’s 
rigid work requirements, albeit with more options 
for how participants can meet them. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE (CBO)  
B. Bloom, S. Mok et al., « An Analysis of 
the President’s 2019 Budget », 24 mai 
2018, 12 p. 
À la lumière des propositions 
budgétaires de l'administration Trump, 
les dépenses fédérales obligatoires en 
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soins de santé seraient réduites de 
1,3 billion de dollars au cours de la 
prochaine décennie. 
Over the next 10 years, the cumulative deficit un-
der the President's proposals would be $2.9 tril-
lion less than the $12.4 trillion in CBO's baseline. 
The deficit would average 3.7 percent of GDP, 
CBO estimates. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE (CBO)  
K. Fritzsche, K. McNellis et al., « Federal 
Subsidies for Health Insurance Coverage 
for People Under Age 65: 2018 to 2028 », 
23 mai 2018, 33 p. 
La taxe d’accise sur les régimes 
d’assurance à primes élevées annoncée 
pour 2022 devrait inciter certains 
employeurs à adopter des régimes 
d'assurance-maladie assortis de  
primes moins élevées. 
CBO and JCT project that the federal subsidies, 
taxes, and penalties associated with health insur-
ance coverage for people under age 65 will result 
in a net subsidy from the federal government of 
$685 billion in 2018. 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 
L. Mishel, « Uber and the Labor Market: 
Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages, and 
the Scale of Uber and the Gig Economy », 
15 mai 2018, 29 p. 
Les résultats de l’étude renforcent le 
scepticisme à l’effet qu’Uber, et plus 
largement l’économie du partage, 
représentent le futur du travail. 
There has been a continuing, strong debate about 
the size of the gig economy and the pay earned by 
gig economy workers—specifically as gig work 
scope and pay relates to Uber, the leading gig 
economy firm. The debate has been fueled by a 
number of recent studies using differing and mis-
leading measures of Uber pay and the size of the 
gig economy. For example, some pay studies pre-
sent measures of driver earnings that do not de-
duct Uber commissions, or driver’s expenses, or 
the cost of benefits Uber drivers must fund on 
their own (as they are classified as contract work-
ers, not “employees”). Some scope studies look at 
the raw number of drivers but don’t account for 
the fact that most ride-hailing drivers drive far 
fewer than 40 hours a week and only for a few 
months a year. This paper seeks to provide clarity 
by offering a framework for understanding vari-
ous pay and size concepts and a common terminol-
ogy. Then, using newly available administrative 
data on Uber drivers, it answers two key ques-
tions: (1) what is the hourly pay earned by Uber 
drivers comparable to hourly wages or compensa-
tion of payroll employees (i.e., driver net income 
after accounting for Uber commissions and fees, 
vehicle expenses, payroll employees’ benefits, and 
the interaction of expenses and benefits with the 
tax code)?; and (2) what is the scale of Uber, and 
gig work, in the overall economy? 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
J. Roberts et A. Michel, « Trump Cut 
America’s Taxes: Now He Should Defund 
OECD Efforts to Raise Them », 29 mai 
2018, 9 p. 
Les États-Unis devraient arrêter de 
financer des les projets de l'OCDE qui 
impliquent un taux d'imposition plus 
élevé comme le BEPS. 
The OECD’s BEPS project and the resulting Mul-
tilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Re-
lated Measures to Prevent BEPS are nothing 
more than international tax regulators’ latest at-
tempt to increase taxes on international busi-
nesses. The OECD proposal aims to centralize and 
harmonize global tax rules and increase effective 
tax rates on international firms. If the European 
states continue to find value in OECD products to 
support larger and more intrusive governments, 
they should find a way to fund those activities 
without the help of the American taxpayer. The 
OECD should not be provided with the confiden-
tial tax information of U.S. companies and citizens 
and, through privatization, it should be given the 
opportunity to sell its research in the market-
place—instead of imposing the cost of producing 
its pro-tax research on American taxpayers. 
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HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
A. Michel, « When It Comes to Taxation, 
Borders Matter—Europe and the U.S. 
Should Act Accordingly », 29 mai 2018, 
12 p. 
Les États-Unis et l'Europe devraient 
respecter leurs limites territoriales dans 
l'application de leurs impôts. Le critère 
de la présence physique devrait être 
respecté. 
The European Commission (EC) and certain U.S. 
states are renewing their efforts to expand taxing 
authority beyond their borders. Many policymak-
ers see the EC’s digital-transactions tax and the 
expansion of state sales taxes to out-of-state re-
tailers as separate issues. However, the two poli-
cies have the same principle at their core. Without 
a physical presence requirement, destination-
based taxes expand the extraterritorial reach of 
distant politicians into local affairs. The authority 
for governments to tax should stop at their border. 
A more broadly applied U.S. sales tax or a Euro-
pean digital tax will limit tax competition and ir-
reversibly expand the scope and power of govern-
ments at all levels. 
INSTITUTION ON TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY (ITEP) 
C. Davis, « SALT/Charitable Workaround 
Credits Require a Broad Fix, Not a Nar-
row One », 23 mai 2018, 21 p. 
Le Congrès devrait permettre une 
déduction fédérale complète pour tous les 
dons de bienfaisance et se concentrer sur 
l’instauration d’une nouvelle loi qui 
viserait les avantages fiscaux importants 
de l’État, et ainsi éviter d’imposer des 
exigences administratives sur la plupart 
des dons de bienfaisance. 
The federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted 
last year temporarily capped deductions for state 
and local tax (SALT) payments at $10,000 per 
year. The cap, which expires at the end of 2025, 
disproportionately impacts taxpayers in higher-
income states and in states and localities more re-
liant on income or property taxes, as opposed to 
sales taxes. Increasingly, lawmakers in those 
states who feel their residents were unfairly tar-
geted by the federal law are debating and enacting 
tax credits that can help some of their residents 
circumvent this cap—a policy this report will refer 
to as “workaround credits.” Specifically, states are 
offering sizeable tax credits in return for making 
so-called charitable gifts, rather than ordinary 
SALT payments, to support public services. This 
is advantageous to some taxpayers because chari-
table gifts are treated much more favorably than 
SALT payments under the new federal tax code. 
For taxpayers, using these credits will result in a 
somewhat higher payment to their state govern-
ments (or in some cases, local governments) be-
cause the credits only offset part of the cost of do-
nating. In New York, for instance, 85 percent of 
the donation is returned to the donor with tax 
credits. But for high-income taxpayers able to 
itemize at the federal level, the added benefits of 
the federal charitable deduction will often be large 
enough to both offset that higher state payment 
and return a net financial benefit to the taxpayer. 
Notably, most of the high-income taxpayers likely 
to benefit from these credits already received sig-
nificant federal tax cuts under the TCJA. 
TAX FOUNDATION 
E. York, « The Complicated Taxation of 
America’s Retirement Accounts », 22 mai 
2018, 10 p. 
Les lois fiscales favorisent la 
consommation par rapport à l'épargne. 
Ces « pénalités » à l'épargne devraient 
être abolies. 
Personal saving, the setting aside of resources to-
day to get benefits in the future, is taxed in a va-
riety of ways in the United States. Ordinary in-
come tax treatment taxes income when first 
earned, and, if saved, taxes the returns on the sav-
ing (the reward one “buys” by saving). By contrast, 
income used for immediate consumption is taxed 
only once by the income tax; the income tax does 
not fall again on what one buys with the after-tax 
income. This second layer of tax on the rewards for 
saving favors immediate consumption over de-
layed consumption. 
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The tax treatment of retirement accounts, how-
ever, removes this bias for a limited amount of 
personal saving. Neutrality is achieved in one of 
two ways: defer tax on the saving and tax all re-
turns of principal and earnings, or tax the amount 
saved up front and exempt all returns from addi-
tional tax. Either way, saving in retirement sys-
tems and consumption face the same lifetime tax 
burden, in present value. This neutrality is lim-
ited, though, by numerous rules and restrictions 
that govern retirement accounts, making the tax 
structure of long-term savings complex and bi-
ased. 
TAX FOUNDATION 
A. El-Sibaie, « Capital Cost Recovery 
across the OECD, 2018 », 24 mai 2018, 
10 p. 
Il y a un déséquilibre dans le traitement 
des dépenses en capital aux États-Unis, 
ce qui défavorise certaines dépenses, 
notamment dans les structures et en 
propriété intellectuelle. 
However, the statutory corporate income tax rate 
was not the only feature of the business tax code 
that adversely affects the economy. Capital con-
sumption allowances (how much of the cost of a 
capital investment a business can claim as an ex-
pense) directly affect a business’s taxable income 
and thus affects the amount of tax it pays. When 
businesses are not allowed to fully deduct capital 
expenditures, they spend less on capital, which re-
duces worker productivity and wages. 
Currently, the U.S. tax code only allows busi-
nesses to recover an average of 67.7 percent of a 
capital investment (e.g., an investment in build-
ings, machinery, intangibles, etc.). This is slightly 
higher than the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development’s (OECD) average capi-
tal allowance of 67.2 percent. The U.S. capital al-
lowances for intangibles is 63.3 percent, lower 
than the OECD average of 75.1 percent. For ma-
chinery, the U.S. has a capital allowance of 100 
percent due to temporary 100 percent bonus de-
preciation provided by the TCJA, whereas the 
OECD has a lower average of 83.5 percent. The 
U.S. is deficient in its treatment of nonresidential 
structures, providing an allowance of only 35 per-
cent over their rather long 39-year asset lives, 
while the OECD average is 47 percent. 
TAX FOUNDATION 
E. York, « The Fixtures Fix: Correcting 
the Drafting Error Involving the Expen-
sing of Qualified Improvement Property », 
30 mai 2018, 10 p. 
Le TCJA exclue certaines formes 
d'investissements du « 100 percent  
bonus depreciation », ce qui fait en sorte 
que ces dépenses ont un traitement 
moins favorable qu'auparavant. 
However, the law excludes some categories of 
business investment from 100 percent bonus de-
preciation. For instance, many interior improve-
ments to buildings are not eligible for the provi-
sion, and will be required to be written off over 
time periods as long as 39 years. This exclusion is 
widely believed to have been due to a legislative 
oversight: Congress seems to have intended build-
ing improvements to be eligible for 100 percent bo-
nus depreciation, but left them out due to a last-
minute drafting error. As a result, the new tax law 
actually worsens the tax treatment of this type of 
investment, which previously qualified for bonus 
depreciation, by reducing the ability of businesses 
to deduct their full building improvement costs. 
Ideally, all business expenses should be immedi-
ately deductible, including the amount that busi-
nesses spend on capital investment. As such, the 
exclusion of building improvements from the ben-
efit of 100 percent bonus depreciation—whether 
accidental or not—is unjustified. Policymakers 
should act to ensure that qualified improvement 
property is eligible for 100 percent bonus depreci-
ation; at a minimum, they should make sure that 
the rules for deducting the cost of building im-
provements do not become more restrictive than 
they previously were. 
TAX POLICY CENTER (TPC) 
B. H. Harris et A. Looney, « The Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act: A Missed Opportunity to 
Establish a Sustainable Tax Code »,  
24 mai 2018, 29 p.  
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La plupart des économistes s'entendent 
sur le fait qu'une bonne réforme fiscale 
devrait tendre vers une imposition de la 
consommation, un élargissement de 
l'assiette fiscale et une diminution du 
taux d'imposition sur les revenus, alors 
que le Tax Cuts and Jobs Act va en  
sens inverse. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 leaves many 
promises of tax reform unfulfilled. In this paper, 
we examinethe plan’s prospects to boost future 
growth,and discuss fundamental reforms that 
would boost the stock of capital and generate sus-
tained, long-term growth. After making the case 
that the current tax code is unsustainableand that 
reform will be revisited, we recommend a series of 
strategies for future Congresses, including limit-
ing windfall tax breaks on already-committed cap-
ital, providingtargeted tax cuts on wages to boost 
labor supply, reducing the most harmfultaxdistor-
tions, and administering the tax codemore effec-
tively. 
URBAN INSTITUTE 
B. Theodos, B. Meixell et C. Hedman, 
« Did States Maximize Their Opportunity 
Zone Selections? Analysis of the Opportu-
nity Zone Designations », 21 mai 2018, 
14 p. 
Le gouvernement devra retracer les 
investissements générés par les incitatifs 
fiscaux afin de vérifier s'ils aboutissent 
dans les régions ciblées et effectuer les 
modifications requises. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act included a new federal 
incentive—Opportunity Zones—to spur invest-
ment in poor and undercapitalized communities. 
Governors (and the mayor of the District of Co-
lumbia) have now selected which among the 
roughly 56 percent of eligible census tracts in the 
U.S. should be classified as Opportunity Zones. 
While many criteria could be used to assess how 
successfully governors targeted Zones, we offer 
two for consideration: need and benefit. In this 
brief we gauge governors’ selections against tract 
measures of the investment flows they are receiv-
ing and the social and economic changes they have 
already experienced. 
   INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE 
Commission Européenne, « The 2018 
Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary 
Projections for the 28 EU Member States 
(2016-2070) », 25 mai 2018, 406 p. 
L’augmentation des dépenses de santé 
publique dans l’Union européenne 
soulève des doutes quant à sa viabilité  
à long terme. 
The long-term projections show where (in which 
countries), when, and to what extent ageing pres-
sures will accelerate as the baby-boom generation 
retires and as the people in the EU are expected 
to live longer in the future. Hence, the projections 
are helpful in highlighting the immediate and fu-
ture policy challenges for governments posed by 
projected demographic trends. The report pro-
vides a very rich set of information at the individ-
ual country level which covers a long time-span 
(until 2070), compiled in a comparable and trans-
parent manner. 
The projections feed into a variety of policy de-
bates and processes at EU level, including the 
overarching Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth. In particular, they 
are used in the context of the European Semester 
so as to identify policy challenges, among others 
in setting the medium term budgetary objectives 
(MTOs), in the annual assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances carried out as part of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and in the analysis on 
the impact of ageing populations on the labour 
market and potential economic growth. 
INTERNATIONAL TAX REVIEW  
B. Brown et M. Woolley, « New Zealand to 
Require Foreign Sellers of Low-Value 
Goods to Register for GST », 17 mai 2018, 
4 p. 
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Les nouvelles règles fiscales proposées 
par le gouvernement néo-zélandais 
quant à l'inscription à la TPS des 
vendeurs étrangers sont susceptibles  
de devenir litigieuses. 
The New Zealand government has released pro-
posals that would require certain foreign sellers, 
online marketplaces and re-deliverers of goods to 
register for, collect and return GST on items deliv-
ered to a New Zealand address, if the value of the 
goods is NZ$400 or less, from October 1 2019, 
write Brendan Brown and Matt Woolley of Russell 
McVeagh. 
ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRA-
TION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
ÉCONOMIQUES (OCDE) 
OCDE, « Country-by-Country Reporting 
– Compilation of Peer Review Reports 
(Phase 1) - Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS: Action 13 », 23 mai 2018, 756 p. 
Parmi les 95 juridictions visées, 60 ont 
un système légal et administratif 
suffisant, 58 ont des accords 
multilatéraux ou bilatéraux en place et 
39 ont fourni les informations 
nécessaires permettant d'assurer que des 
mesures suffisantes soient prises pour 
que les déclarations pays par pays soient 
utilisées à des fins appropriées. 
Under the Action 13 Minimum Standard, jurisdic-
tions have committed to foster tax transparency 
by requesting the largest multinational enterprise 
groups (MNE Groups) to provide the global alloca-
tion of their income, taxes and other indicators of 
the location of economic activity. This unprece-
dented information on MNE Groups’ operations 
across the world will boost tax authorities’ risk-
assessment capabilities. The Action 13 Minimum 
Standard has been translated into specific terms 
of reference and a methodology for the peer review 
process. The peer review of the Action 13 Mini-
mum Standard is proceeding in stages with three 
annual reviews in 2017, 2018 and 2019. The 
phased review process follows the phased imple-
mentation of Country-by-Country (CbC) Report-
ing. Each annual peer review process will there-
fore focus on different aspects of the three key ar-
eas under review: the domestic legal and adminis-
trative framework, the exchange of information 
framework, and the confidentiality and appropri-
ate use of CbC reports. This first annual peer re-
view report reflects the outcome of the first review 
which focused on the domestic legal and adminis-
trative framework. It contains the review of 95 ju-
risdictions which provided legislation or infor-
mation pertaining to the implementation of CbC 
Reporting. 
THE AUSTRALIA INSTITUTE 
M. Grudnoff, « High Income Earners the 
Big Winners From Scrapping 37% Tax 
Bracket », 29 mai 2018, 6 p. 
Si l'administration australienne élimine 
sa tranche d’imposition de 37 %, les 
contribuables peuvent s'attendre à des 
services gouvernementaux de moins 
bonne qualité ou à une imposition plus 
importante des salariés à faibles ou 
moyens revenus. 
High income earners will get 80% of the benefit 
from removing the 37% tax bracket and 60% of 
taxpayers will get no benefit. 
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